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      Nobody’s Perfect: Moral Responsibility in Negligence 
        





Responsibility for negligence is something of a puzzle.  In everyday life as well 
as in the law, we regularly assume that people are responsible for their negligent 
conduct.  Yet, justifying this assumption has proven challenging.  We tend to 
think of responsibility in relation to conduct that is willful, self-guided, 
controlled, and knowingly performed – intentional action being the paradigm.  
What makes explaining responsibility for negligent conduct difficult is 
negligence’s unwittingness.  Negligent conduct is never intentional and is either 
not self-guided or is performed unknowingly and without awareness of its 
negligence.  When acting negligently it is not entirely clear, therefore, how 
one’s agency controls or is even involved in one’s conduct.  In fact, negligent 
conduct can appear to take place regardless and at times even in spite of one’s 
agency, which has led many to doubt the justification of legal as well as the very 
notion of (moral) responsibility for negligence.  
 The paper aims to make two central contributions.  First, offering a 
conception of negligence explaining the role of competency in negligence 
(Section 7).  Second, the paper offers an answer to the puzzle of responsibility 
for negligent conduct (Sections 9 & 10).  In a nutshell, responsibility for an 
instance of negligent conduct turns on ‘quality of agency’ or, more specifically, 
on the quality of one’s agency as an individual (as opposed to as a generic 
person) at performing that type of conduct to one’s competency;  a conclusion 
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arrived at through reflecting on the aforementioned conception of negligence 
and on the often overlooked fact that occasional accidents are an unavoidable 
fact of life and a feature of the inherent fallibility of human agency.          
 To clarify, in “responsibility” my concern is with what is sometimes 
referred to as “moral responsibility” or “personal responsibility.”  Such 
responsibility may attach to conduct as well as to the outcomes of conduct, yet 
my focus here is only on responsibility for the former.  Note that the paper 
discusses negligence as a general normative concept, not the specific case of 
legal negligence; although grounding moral responsibility for negligence 
certainly has implications for the moral grounds of its legal counterpart.  In the 
paper, “negligent conduct” and “negligence” are used interchangeably as are 
“conduct” and “behavior.”  When labeling someone “negligent”, the paper 
refers to a person as behaving negligently.  “Conduct” and “behavior” are used 
to refer to actions and omissions alike.  Finally, the paper refers to certain 
conduct as “unwitting” or “inadvertent,” by which I mean conduct performed 
unintentionally and/or unknowingly.        
 
2 Personal Responsibility for Conduct 
 
A person’s responsibility for conduct turns on a type of connection between 
one’s conduct and one’s practical agency.1  Several features comprise practical 
agency.  H.L.A. Hart, for instance, puts matters in terms of “responsibility 
capacities.”2  Broadly, practical agents possess certain cognitive, rational, and 
epistemic capacities, such as the capacity to understand, detect, and remember 
norms, reasons and facts, and the capacity to reason, feel, deliberate, and to 
make judgments regarding norms, reasons, and facts.  Agents also possess 
practical capacities, including the capacity to choose, make decisions, and 
control their bodies.  Possessing this bundle of capacities constitutes one as a 
subject able to respond (i.e., response-able) to reasons through action (and 
 
1  For such approaches to responsibility see e.g., John M Fischer & Mark 
Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility 
(Cambridge University Press, 1998); Victor Tadros, Criminal Responsibility 
(Oxford University Press, 2007).  
2 HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 1968) at 
154-55, 227-30.  A view further developed and extrapolated on by, for example, 
Tadros Ibid at 227-251 and Joseph Raz, From Normativity to Responsibility 
(Oxford University Press, 2011) at 55-57, 138.  
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omission), transcending compulsion, instinct, and passion.  That is, a rational 
subject who, to an extent, determines her own conduct based on her own volition 
and reasoning.  Accordingly, it is possessing practical agency that makes one 
into the sort of being who can be responsible for what one does. 
 Yet mere capacity for responsibility is not sufficient to ground 
responsibility.  When responsible for conduct, one’s capacities for 
responsibility – that is, one’s practical agency – are somehow connected – 
engaged, expressed, manifested, or involved – in the conduct that one is thereby 
responsible for.  And it is by virtue of such a connection between one’s agency 
and one’s conduct that one is responsible for said conduct.  
 
3 Volitionism and Responsibility for Intentional Conduct 
 
The contrast with the case of responsibility for intentional conduct helps 
illuminate the difficulty in accounting for responsibility for negligence.  With 
origins stemming back to Aristotle, the classic conception of responsibility for 
conduct is that it involves knowledge, willfulness, awareness, and control of 
one’s conduct.3  The basic idea is that A’s responsibility for phi-ing depends on 
her having phi-ed voluntarily and knowingly; a conception of responsibility 
aptly labeled by some “volitionist”.4   The paradigm for this conception of 
responsibility is the intentional action (and omission), wherein the 
responsibility-establishing connection between conduct and agency is obvious.  
When acting intentionally one’s capacities for responsibility are clearly engaged 
in carrying out the action for which one is responsible.  Intentional action is 
willed, initiated, controlled, guided and generally is knowingly and willfully 
performed by one’s agency.  There seems to be, therefore, at least no pre-
theoretical mystery as to how intentional action is ascribable to one’s agency 
and therefore why we hold people responsible for their intentional actions and, 
correspondingly, why we identify them with, evaluate them, and credit or hold 
them liable for those actions.  The same seems true, mutatis mutandis, for 
intentional omissions.  In contrast, accounting for the responsibility-establishing 
connection between agency and negligent conduct is much less straightforward.     
 
 
3  Antony Duff, “Legal and Moral Responsibility” (2009) 4:6 Philosophy 
Compass 978.   
4  Holly M. Smith, “Non-Tracing Cases of Culpable Ignorance”, (2011) 5:2 
Criminal Law and Philosophy 115 at 121. 
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4 Negligence as Improper Unwitting Conduct  
 
Before exploring the matter of responsibility for negligent conduct we need a 
conception of what comprises such conduct.  All negligence is unwitting, at 
least if we take the term “negligence” to stand for a normative category distinct 
from related categories such as intentional, known, or reckless conduct.  Notice 
that the term “negligence” is deployed in various and at times inconsistent ways, 
be it in natural language, philosophy, or the law.  For instance, in addition to 
accidents the tort of negligence also potentially imposes liability in instances of 
reckless and even intentional wrongdoing.  Similarly, it seems perfectly natural 
to describe someone simultaneously texting and driving as “behaving 
negligently” even though she is fully cognizant of the nature and risks of her 
conduct.  Such uses of the term “negligence” in law and in natural language 
clearly do not translate into the normative category of accidental, unwitting, and 
inadvertent conduct with which I am concerned here. 
 There are at least three categories of negligence.  One involves unwittingly 
omitting from doing something that one would have done intentionally were 
one more aware, accurate, careful, attentive etc.  Examples of such unwitting 
behavior are leaving one’s small child in the car; neglecting calling a friend on 
her birthday; and, failing to stop at a red light while driving or failing to record 
the ‘big game.’  A second type of negligence involves intentionally trying to do 
one thing only to inadvertently end up doing something else, such as intending 
to pick up a glass yet dropping it on the floor; intending to step on the brake 
pedal only to accidentally step on the gas pedal instead; or attempting to give 
exact change yet confusing the coins’ denominations.  And then there are cases 
of unwittingly failing to do that which one should have done.5 
 Yet negligence is more than mere accident – negligence also has a 
normative component.  Negligence is conduct that is in some sense improper.  
It is conduct in violation of some standard.  The standard may be internal – as 
just explained, often when negligent we do something accidentally that we 
would not have done had we been aware or more fully in control of our conduct.  
Here what makes the accident negligent is the failure to live up to one’s own 
standards residing in one’s intentions or background aspirations, commitments, 
and values.  This type of unwitting conduct may count as negligent because it 
is conduct in conflict with one’s own will and agency – giving reason for self-
 
5 This third category often – although not necessarily – overlaps with one of the 
previous two.   
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directed critical reactions, such as blame, disappointment, or annoyance with 
oneself.  For example, I am negligent if I intend to pick up a glass yet it 
unwittingly slips from my grasp and shatters on the floor.  Or when unwittingly 
running a red light one might thereby act against one’s background commitment 
to obey law, or the value that one puts on one’s own safety and on the safety of 
others, or one’s aspirations of being a good driver. 
 Negligence may also turn on violating an external standard.  For instance, 
the philosophical literature on negligence is almost entirely devoted to conduct 
that is negligent by virtue of violating a moral imperative.  External normative 
standards also come in other forms – standards of civility, professional codes of 
conduct, rules of games, aesthetic standards, social norms, norms of association 
and friendship etc.  And the legal tort of negligence is all about the violation of 
judicially determined objective legal standards of conduct.  Unwitting violations 
of all such standards might also qualify as negligent in their respective 
normative realms.  
 What is the relation between negligent conduct predicated on violations of 
these two different types of standards – internal and external?  First, as some of 
the examples above suggest, negligence that is purely self-regarding is not only 
possible but also pervasive – occasionally we unwittingly let ourselves down, 
regardless of whether we thereby also violate some external standard.  Second, 
negligence often involves a violation of both an external and an internal 
standard – frequently our standards for ourselves correspond and adopt the 
external standards that bind us.   
 Finally, can unwitting conduct in violation of an external standard but not 
of an internal standard count as negligent?  That is, can we act negligently when 
unwittingly doing something that is somehow objectively wrongful that we 
would have, nevertheless, done intentionally had we been acting wittingly?  I 
think so, as such cases still involve accidental conduct that is normatively 
problematic vis-à-vis the negligent actor.  For example, under normal conditions 
accidentally running over a person with one’s car is negligent, even if 
unbeknownst to the driver the victim turns out to be the driver’s nemesis.  And 
such accidental conduct remains negligent even if, had the driver been paying 
attention to the road, she would have acted no differently – this time 
intentionally keeping the car on a collision course with her nemesis.  
Accordingly, I take the normativity of negligence as either self-regarding or 
external or both.    
  




Not all improper unwitting conduct constitutes negligence.  Recall the 
assumption that we set out to explain – conducting oneself negligently entails 
one’s responsibility for said conduct.  Accordingly, negligence is improper and 
unwitting conduct for which one is responsible.  Yet the responsibility-
establishing connection between agency and conduct is far less obvious in the 
case of negligence than it is in the case of intentional conduct.  How is one ever 
responsible for phi-ing if one did not intend to phi, did not want to phi, was 
unaware that one was phi-ing or one’s phi-ing was not under the guidance of 
one’s agency?  In such cases there seems, at least on the face of things, no 
responsibility-establishing connection between one’s practical agency and 
one’s negligent conduct.   That is, there appears to be no obvious way in which 
one’s agency is involved, expressed, manifested, or engaged in performing 
one’s conduct.  On the contrary, when negligent our agency appears disengaged 
from our (accidental) conduct rather than involved in carrying it out.  Moreover, 
we saw that when negligent we often act against our will in the sense that we do 
that which we would not have done intentionally had we been aware or in better 
control of our conduct.  Accordingly, negligence can seem something that 
happens to us disjointedly from our agency or even in spite of it, rather than 
something that we do as agents.  
 Which is why the case of responsibility in negligence is puzzling.6  On the 
one hand, we regularly ascribe responsibility and, relatedly, also attribute 
liability, hold accountable, as well as make critical evaluations of people based 
on their negligent conduct.  Moreover, when acting negligently we view 
ourselves as negligent.  We do not think that our negligence is something that 
happens to us but rather ‘own’ our negligence, associating ourselves with it as 
responsible agents.  Yet, on the other hand, it is unclear what justifies these 
pervasive ascriptions of responsibility and related ascriptions of ownership, 
liability, and critical evaluations.  In fact, the difficulty in accounting for the 
basis of responsibility for negligent behavior has led many in the literature to 
doubt and even to reject that such responsibility obtains at all7.  
 
6 For more on the puzzle of responsibility in negligence see Ori J Herstein, 
“Responsibility in Negligence: Why the Duty of Care is Not a Duty 'To Try'” 
(2010) 23:2 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 403; Michael J. 
Zimmerman, “Moral Responsibility and Ignorance” (1997) 107:3 Ethics 410. 
7  Jules L Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (Cambridge University Press, 1992) at 
217-20; Tony Honoré, “The Morality of Tort Law – Questions and Answers” 
in DG Owen, ed, Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Clarendon Press, 
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6 Could Have Done Otherwise   
 
 We think of negligent conduct as conditioned on capacity – conduct is not 
negligent without the capacity to do otherwise.  Here capacity is divisible into 
two types.  There are conditions independent of the agent, that is, capacity to 
phi requires opportunity to phi.  And then there are conditions regarding the 
agent herself, mainly possessing the ability to phi.  For example, a misdiagnosis 
is not negligent if the physician lacked the requisite training to spot the telling 
symptoms or if no such symptoms were manifest, making diagnosis practically 
impossible.  In both cases although the physician unwittingly misdiagnosed the 
patient, she did not do so negligently as she lacked either the ability or the 
practical opportunity to make the right diagnosis.        
 Accordingly, although when negligent we do not act intentionally and often 
not even knowingly, it may seem that that does not make our negligence any 
less ours.   After all, when negligent we – as responsible agents – should have 
and could have done otherwise, which seemingly makes us responsible for not 
doing so.  In broad strokes this is the response Hart and others give to the puzzle 
of responsibility in negligence.8 
 
1995) 73; Gideon Rosen, “Culpability and Ignorance” (2003) 103 Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Society New Series 61; Claire O Finkelstein, 
“Responsibility for Unintended Consequences” (2005) 2 Ohio State Criminal 
Law Journal 578; Larry Alexander & Kimberly Ferzan, “Against Negligence 
Liability” in P Robinson & K. Ferzan eds, Criminal Law Conversations 
(Oxford University Press, 2009) 273-280; Matt King, “The Problem with 
Negligence” (2009) 35 Social Theory and Practice 577; Heidi M Hurd, 
“Finding No Fault with Negligence” in John Oberdiek ed, Philosophical 
Foundations of the Law of Torts (Oxford University Press, 2014) 387.  
8 Hart, supra note 2 at 147-52; AJ Ayer, Philosophical Essays (Macmillan 
1954) at 27; George Fletcher, “The Theory of Criminal Negligence” (1971) 119 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 401; Anthony Duff, Answering for 
Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Hart Publishing, 
2007) at 71; John Gardner, “The Purity and Priority of Private Law” (1996) 46 
University of Toronto Law Journal 459; John Gardner, “Obligations and 
Outcomes in the Law of Torts” in Peter Cane & John Gardner eds, Relating 
to Responsibility: Essays for Tony Honoré on His 80th Birthday (Hart 
Publishing, 2001) 111.  
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 But does not the initial puzzle persist?  Why is capacity to do otherwise – 
even when assuming that one should have done otherwise – sufficient to 
establish responsibility for failing to do so?  After all, considering that 
negligence is a type of unwitting conduct it seems that agency is disengaged 
from it.  Moreover, remember that some negligence involves acting in spite of 
one’s agency.  Accordingly, at least on the face of things, one’s agency does not 
appear manifested, expressed, involved, or engaged in carrying out one’s 
negligent conduct.  On the contrary, when we do something unwittingly or 
accidentally our agency seems almost absent from our behavior.  The fact that 
one could have done otherwise but unwittingly did not do so does not seem to 
entail that one’s agency was engaged in one’s conduct – it’s not as if one’s 
agency actively brought about its own unwittingness.  An agent’s capacity to do 
otherwise than phi-ing is possibly a necessary condition for her responsibility 
for her phi-ing but, in any case, does not seem sufficient; at least if we accept 
that responsibility for conduct is predicated on one’s agency’s involvement, 
engagement, expression, or manifestation in the conduct.  It appears, therefore, 
that even accepting ‘capacity to do otherwise’ as a feature of negligence, 
something more is still needed to establish that negligence involves a 
responsibility-establishing connection between a person’s agency and her 
conduct. 
 The question remains, therefore, whether and if so how does negligence 
involve agency in a way that establishes responsibility for such conduct?  Is 
negligence a type of conduct that one performs as a practical agent?  I think it 
is.  It’s not as if Hart et al are not onto something.  What we need to figure out 
is what exactly – beyond capacity to do otherwise – accounts for the 
responsibility-establishing connection between one’s agency and one’s 
unwitting negligent conduct.    
 
7 Negligence and Competency  
 
An answer to the puzzle begins with realizing that negligence is not just about 
capacity to do otherwise, but is also predicated on a largely overlooked feature 
of negligence, which is competency to do otherwise.9  Competency for phi-ing 
 
9 Legal negligence is typically not conditioned on competency.  See Vaughan v 
Menlove [1837] 3 Bing. N.C. 467.    
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is the ability to phi reliably and with relative confidence and ease.10 Competency 
incorporates the various actions (and omissions) that – barring a competency-
defeating event (e.g., fainting, fatigue, illness) – one’s agency assumes and 
relies on as available to one.  Our competency normally includes numerous 
features, from the remarkable to the mundane – speaking a language, calculating 
costs and benefits, driving, walking, remembering, playing a musical instrument, 
dancing, conversing and so on and so forth.   
 For example, I certainly have the capacity to make a layup in basketball so 
if I attempt to make such a shot and succeed I am thereby responsible for making 
the shot.11  Nevertheless, at this point in my life I am alas no longer a competent 
lay-up shooter.  Accordingly, were I to attempt a handful of shots and 
inadvertently miss them all, for me missing would not be negligent.  I believe 
most people would agree that so long as I tried in earnest I’m in the clear – my 
missing is unfortunate for my team and disappointing to me yet is not negligent.  
Missing does not, for instance, make me vulnerable to criticism.  In contrast, 
given their skill, for most professional basketball players such a sequence of 
misses is negligent – mere trying will not do.  What explains the intuitively clear 
difference between my case and the case of the professional is the fact that 
negligence involves not only failing to perform to one’s ability but also failing 
to perform to one’s competency.   
 Accordingly, negligence involves failing to meet a standard requiring 
conduct that is reliably, regularly, readily, and relatively easily and confidently 
available to one.  Ability alone is not enough.  Negligence, therefore, is not only 
about what one had capacity to do and would have intentionally done and/or 
should have done, but is also about what one could have competently done. 
 One’s competency for phi-ing is of course sensitive to one’s actual 
performance and success at phi-ing, but performance is not solely determinative 
of competency.  The fact is that one can succeed in doing what one is 
incompetent at as well as occasionally fail to perform to one’s competency.  The 
space between competency and actual performance is most salient when we fail 
to perform to our competency.  When the professional basketball player from 
the example above uncharacteristically misses a layup, his and others’ 
annoyance and disappointment are predicated on his failure to deliver on his 
competency – given his competency mere trying does not exculpate from 
 
10   Raz, supra note 2 2011 at 243-251; Ori J Herstein, “Responsibility in 
Negligence: Discussion of From Normativity to Responsibility” (2013) 8:1 
Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 167. 
11 A “layup” is considered the easiest shot in the game of basketball.   
  
 10 
negligence.  Accordingly, here missing does not entail reduced competency but 
rather a failure to perform to one’s competency.  Denying the gap between 
competency and actual performance – that is taking performance as fully 
determinative of competency – can’t make sense of the annoyance at and the 
disappointment with the professional player and how that case differs from the 
case of the amateur.   
 Now obviously regularly failing to phi most likely entails one’s lack of 
competency for phi-ing.  For example, were a basketball player to continue 
uncharacteristically missing most of his layups, at some point we would say that 
his competency changed for the worse, and that his misses are simply reflective 
of his now diminished abilities rather than aberrations of the sort that justify, for 
example, surprise, disappointment, and criticism for missing.  Yet the fact that 
competency is subject to change does not entail that such change is entirely 
subservient to one’s performance in every specific case.  There is a space 
allowing for exceeding and for failing to perform to one’s competency.  
Negligence resides in that space.   
 
8 Negligence as Failure of Agency  
 
Intentional conduct involves responsibility for success while responsibility for 
negligence is responsibility for failing.  What do I mean by ‘success’?  
Responsibility for intentional conduct is responsibility for acting (or omitting) 
as one intended.  Here responsibility is a function of the agent’s intention to do 
what she in fact did.  Negligence is different.  When negligent one unwittingly 
fails to do that which one should have done, or what one intended to do or what 
one would have (intentionally) done.  The question of responsibly for 
negligence is how are we ever responsible for unwitting failure?   
 Negligence is not just any failure.  It is a failure of agency to meet its own 
competency as required by some standard.  Negligence is unwittingly not doing 
what we should have and could have competently done, which suggests that 
when negligent something in our agency – that is in our responsibility capacities 
– goes awry.  Negligent conduct, therefore, involves an unwitting failing, 
misfire, or malfunction in agency, derailing oneself from performing to one’s 
own competency.12 
 Accordingly, it seems that the sought-after responsibility-establishing 
connection between one’s agency and one’s negligent conduct is that negligence 
 
12 Raz, supra note 2 2011 at 227-50. 
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is a form of conduct that expresses, involves, and manifests a failure of one’s 
agency.  Another way of putting this is that while we do not intend our agency’s 
failure – it is unwitting – our agency is nevertheless still present in our 
negligence which manifests, expresses, and generally involves our agency 
through the malfunction, misfiring, and failing of the responsibility capacities 
that our agency comprises.   
 The realization that negligent conduct involves agency failure may seem, 
therefore, to account for what is missing from the Hartian approach – the elusive 
responsibility-establishing relation between agency and negligent conduct.  
Nevertheless, although certainly a crucial step forward, things are more 
complicated still.  Because, as argued below, not all instances of agency failures 
to meet one’s own competency to do otherwise in violation of a standard can 
underpin personal responsibility.          
 
9 ‘Nobody’s Perfect’: Quality of Agency and Responsibility for     
Negligence     
 
No one is perfect.  A measure of unwitting failures is part of life.  Even the best 
of us will, invariably, make inadvertent errors and have accidents.  It is 
unavoidable.  Unpacking what this fact entails for responsibility for unwitting 
conduct will pave the way towards understanding responsibility in negligence.      
 I will argue from a hypothetical.  Ed and Ned are both surgeons.  Ed is an 
outstanding surgeon who hardly ever errs, nearly always performing to his 
professional competency.  Like Ed, Ned is a competent surgeon of similar 
training and skill.  Thus, when performing to their competency their doctoring 
is equally good.  Only that Ned suffers from occasional inadvertent errors and 
slipups.  On a given day both Ed and Ned perform surgery and inadvertently 
perform identically badly.  For instance, each of them accidently neglects to 
extract a surgical clamp from his patient’s abdominal cavity or overestimates 
the required size of an incision.  The question is, does the responsibility of each 
of them for his respective error differ from the other’s, considering the 
variations in their overall aptitude in performing to their competency?  And if 
so, why?   
 What if anything differentiates Ed’s case from Ned’s?  It is neither their 
competency nor the nature of their error – both are competent surgeons of 
similar training, skill, ability, knowledge, and experience.  And both make 
exactly the same errors.  Where Ed and Ned do differ is in the background 
quality of their agency when it comes to doctoring.  To clarify, by ‘quality of 
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agency’ I do not refer to the pair’s competencies at doctoring – which are similar 
– but rather to how good they are at meeting their individual competency for 
doctoring – in which Ed and Ned differ dramatically.   
 To appreciate the crucial distinction between one’s competency and the 
quality of one’s agency at meeting one’s competency, and to understand the 
corresponding difference between Ed and Ned, recall my earlier distinction 
(Section 7) between competency and actual performance to one’s competency 
and how actual performance can – and does, due to the inevitably of agency 
failure – fall short of competency.  Here “quality of agency” refers to how able 
one is at closing the gap between one’s competency for phi-ing and one’s actual 
successes at phi-ing.        
 It is the difference in the quality of Ed and Ned’s respective agencies for 
meeting their respective competencies that explains the variance between their 
records.  Ed’s agency is like a Swiss clock, rarely missing a beat and almost 
always performing to its competency.  Ed’s record, therefore, is near perfect and 
at the forefront of his profession, while Ned’s record – due to occasional 
unwitting failures in agency – is less impressive.  In other words, although of 
similar competency, Ned’s responsibility capacities, unlike Ed’s, are prone to 
occasional malfunction and failure, which is why Ed almost always lives up to 
his competency while Ned occasionally does not.  When it comes to doctoring, 
the quality of Ed’s agency in terms of meeting his competency is far superior to 
Ned’s.   
 A key insight to draw from all this is that given the very high quality of Ed’s 
agency at meeting his competency when doctoring, his rare unwitting failures 
are less or even hardly at all his in the sense that establishes personal 
responsibility.  Here is why.  For a person possessing the pair’s high level of 
competency it is certainly possible to surpass Ned’s mediocre surgical record.  
In contrast, exceeding Ed’s rate of success is nearly impossible, which is 
indicative of the quality of Ed’s agency at meeting his competency for doctoring 
– it is near perfect.  In this respect, Ed’s agency is near to as good as any person 
could possibly be at meeting her competency.   
 Now to err is human – a measure of failure is a fact of life.  Accordingly, 
given the very high quality of Ed’s agency at meeting his competency, his case 
of unwitting malpractice is much more an expected result of his fallibility as a 
generic human agent than it is a product of his shortcomings as an individual.   
In other words, given that his agency is nearly as good as any can be at meeting 
its competency, Ed’s rare unwitting failure is not so much an expression or 
manifestation of a failure of his agency as an individual as it is a feature of 
human agency as such.  No matter how impeccable, no one’s agency is perfect.  
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A measure of imperfection, that is some measure of agency failure at living up 
to one’s competency, is inevitable.  It is because of this that Ed’s negligence is 
less an expression and manifestation of his practical agency as an individual 
person and more a feature of his generic human fallibility.  And remember the 
account of responsibility given at the outset: We are not responsible for conduct 
that is not carried out by nor involves, manifests, or expresses our agency; such 
conduct is not attributable to us as individual practical agents.  Thus, taking 
seriously the idea of personal responsibility along with the fact that ‘nobody’s 
perfect’, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that human imperfection impacts the 
measure of our responsibility and sets limits on it. 
 In our example, it is only to competent yet occasionally careless Ned that 
we can comfortably ascribe responsibility for unwitting errors during the 
operation.  Unlike nearly perfect Ed, whose quality of agency at doctoring 
represents the best anyone could hope to realistically achieve, Ned’s failure is 
due much more to a failure in his individual agency – he failed – than to the 
shortcomings inherent to his generic humanity.  
 But what exactly does it mean for conduct to involve failure as a generic 
human agent as well as failure as an individual agent?  Only imperfect agents 
ever fail to meet their competency, which is why all unwitting failures to meet 
our competency to an extent reflect, involve, and manifest the innate fallibility 
of our agency.  Yet the fact that we never overcome the imperfections inherent 
to being human does not entail that our individual agency cannot do better or 
worse at meeting our competency.  Thus, the shortcomings of our agency 
reflected in our agency failures are a mix of generic human imperfection and of 
the degree to which our individual agency falls short of reaching its individual 
(imperfect) potential.  The measure of these ingredients in the ‘mix’ may 
fluctuate depending on the context and on the qualities of the individual agent.  
Thus, the better one is at phi-ing to one’s competency, the less one’s agency – 
as an individual – is involved, reflected, or manifested in one’s rare instance of 
unwittingly failing to competently phi.     
 Accordingly, explaining the responsibility-establishing relation between an 
agent and her negligent behavior in terms of the failure of agency inherent to 
negligent conduct is flawed.  What Ed’s example teaches us is that when an 
agent who reached the top of human capacity for phi-ing unwittingly fails at 
phi-ing, she is not responsible for her unwitting malpractice.  If a failure in 
agency solely involves and only reflects one’s humanity and not at all one’s 
shortcomings as an individual, then one’s individual agency is not involved, 
reflected, nor manifested in one’s agency’s failure.  Such failure does not exhibit 
a responsibility-establishing connection between the individual person’s agency 
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and her unwitting conduct.     
 Given the account of responsibility as a relation between agency and 
conduct, it follows that responsibility comes in degrees.  A person as good at 
phi-ing as is humanly possible is an ideal type.  People generally fall somewhere 
between the (inherently imperfect) human ideal and utter incompetence.  
Accordingly, the extent to which one’s conduct involves – engages, expresses, 
manifests – one’s individual agency can fluctuate.  Entailing that one may be 
more or less responsible.  Thus, in the case of negligence, responsibility grows 
the more the failure of one’s agency is due to shortcomings in one’s facility – 
as an individual agent – to live up to one’s competency.  In contrast, one’s 
responsibility for one’s negligence diminishes the more it is due to failings in 
one’s agency as a generic human agent.  It is only the ideal type who is not at 
all responsible for her unwitting failures, as her agency (as an individual) is not 
at all involved in her failure.    
 These insights apply to our example.  Ed and Ned are equal in their human 
imperfection yet differ in their quality as individual agents when it comes to 
doctoring.  This is evidenced in the pair’s very different records of success, 
notwithstanding their similar competencies.  Considering that he comes close to 
being as able at doctoring as any human can be, nearly perfect Ed’s rare episodes 
of negligence involve mostly his imperfections as a human agent and far less 
his shortcomings as an individual agent, of which, in the context of doctoring, 
he has few.  And this is why Ed is not responsible for his malpractice or, at least, 
why he is far less responsible than Ned, whose negligent conduct involves, 
expresses, and manifests much more of his agency as an individual.  For 
instance, freed from external pressures, the appropriate response for the chief of 
surgery to Ed’s failure is less to blame him and more to console and empathize, 
telling Ed that everyone makes mistakes and that nobody’s perfect, not even he.  
The fact is that we can only expect so much of people.  A certain measure of 
accidental error is just part of the human condition.  
 My conclusion from all this is that responsibility for an instance of negligent 
phi-ing turns on the quality of one’s individual agency at meeting one’s 
competency at phi-ing.  Here is why.  As argued above, agency failure accounts 
for how agency can be involved, expressed, and manifested in one’s unwitting 
conduct.  Yet, as we just saw, not all agency failures leading to unwitting and 
improper conduct establish personal responsibility for such conduct.  Only those 
agency failures involving one’s agency as an individual establish such 
responsibility.   Moreover, the measure of involvement of one’s agency as an 
individual in one’s unwitting phi-ing determines the measure of one’s 
responsibility for phi-ing.  Which is why responsibility for an instance of 
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unwittingly failing to phi turns on the background quality of one’s agency at 
meeting one’s competency for phi-ing: the better one is at phi-ing at one’s 
competency the less one’s occasional agency failures while phi-ing involve, 
manifest, and reflect one’s individual agency, making one less responsible for 
such failures. 
 What exactly is this “background quality of agency” and how does it relate 
to one’s past record at phi-ing?  Any instance of unwitting failure involves a 
certain competency which one unwittingly fails to meet.  How good one is at 
meeting that competency – that is the quality of one’s agency at doing so – is a 
background fact about one’s agency.  For example, given the quality of his 
agency at doctoring, going into any given operation Ed has a 99.9% chance of 
performing to his competency.  
 Notice that quality of agency is typically diachronic.  Our abilities do not 
just appear and disappear spontaneously.  Rather, they mostly gradually and 
incrementally develop, change, and form over time.13  Thus, although quality of 
agency is forever changing and is therefore always somewhat vague, typically 
it is fairly stable.  Accordingly, how good one is at any given time at meeting 
one’s competency for phi-ing is almost invariably a diachronic matter.  Sudden 
or rapid advances and deteriorations in agency quality do occur, such as 
developmental leaps in small children.  And when such rapid changes occur, the 
quality of one’s agency is of course not a matter of gradual development.  The 
same is true for temporary agency-defeating events, for instance intoxication, a 
passing illness or fatigue, during which the quality of one’s agency might dip.  
But for the most part, at any given moment the quality of one’s agency at 
meeting one’s competency for phi-ing is more or less the same as it was in the 
relatively recent past and will be in the relatively near future.  Which is why, 
although hardly an exact science, the best evidence for what is the quality of 
one’s agency at the time of any given instance of agency failure is usually one’s 
record of performing that type of conduct.     
 To conclude, personal responsibility for an instance of negligence is a 
feature of how good one’s agency is at living up to one’s competency for 
performing that type of activity.  The better one is at meeting one’s own 
competency for phi-ing, the more one’s occasional unwitting agency failures at 
 
13 On the historicity of agency and responsibility see Fischer & Ravizza, supra 
note 1 at 194-201; Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other (Harvard 
University Press, 1998) at 278-79; Tadros, supra note 1 at 140-42; Michael 
McKenna, “A Modest Historical Theory of Moral Responsibility” (2016) 20:1 
Journal of Ethics 83.  
  
 16 
phi-ing are due to one’s humanity and less to one’s shortcomings as an 
individual agent, thereby making one less personally responsible.  This is 
because the higher the quality of one’s agency at meeting one’s competency, 
the less one’s agency – as an individual – is involved, expressed, and manifested 
in one’s instances of negligence.  Conversely. the worse one is at meeting one’s 
own competency for phi-ing, the more one’s occasional unwitting agency 
failures at phi-ing are due to one’s shortcomings as an individual agent, thereby 
making one more personally responsible.    
 
10 Elucidations and Responses to Possible Objections 
 
10.1   But Isn’t Our Humanity Part of Us?     
And if so, why are we less or even not at all responsible for negligence involving 
our humanity rather than our individual agency?  Well, the view that our 
humanity comes with a measure of built-in responsibility for unintended, 
unwitting and accidental conduct – regardless of the features or the involvement 
of our agency as individuals – is anathema to the idea of personal responsibility.  
Such a view entails that we are responsible for what our individual agency is 
not engaged, manifested, expressed, or involved in bringing about.  It is a view 
echoing doctrines of original sin.  I cannot believe that we are responsible for 
our unwitting wrongdoings simply by virtue of being born human.  Personal 
responsibility inherently turns on those features that make us into individual 
agents – on our responsibility capacities and on how we exercise them – not on 
the background features of our generic humanity.  For me, here we reach 
bedrock.  Nowadays society is drenched in blame-culture, yet as unintuitive as 
it may seem to us the fact is that Ed is just not responsible.           
 
10.2   But Ed’s Conduct Was Improper, Wasn’t It?  
Yes, it was.  In fact, it was likely wrongful as it violated the patient’s rights.  
Which is why Ed shouldn’t, for example, respond to his patient’s complaints by 
saying “it wasn’t me, it was my humanity.”  But this is not a problem for my 
account of responsibility in negligence.  We are often attached in a morally 
significant way to what our agency is wrapped up with, even without being 
responsible for it.  For instance, while Ed probably would as well as should feel 
a measure of remorse for his conduct, he ought not and probably would not have 
similar sentiments towards Ned’s malpractice.  Yet such sentiments in relation 
to what he did are not necessarily an indication of Ed’s responsibility for his 
malpractice.  Rather the phenomenon of “agent regret,” to borrow Bernard 
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Williams’ terminology, is the better explanation of the appropriateness of such 
sentiments.14 Similarly, any anger Ed’s aggrieved patient may understandably 
harbor towards Ed is best explained in terms of resentment rather than as 
reflective of Ed’s responsibility.15  The realm of moral sentiments is a rich one, 
explaining our various reasonable reactions to improper conduct without 
necessarily committing to notions of original sin.         
 
10.3   Good at Doing What One Is Good at Doing? 
But is not the distinction between competency and quality of agency at meeting 
one’s competency artificial?  Are the two not the same thing?  Is being bad at 
meeting one’s competency not the same is being incompetent?  I think not.  
Denying the distinction between an agent’s competency for phi-ing and her 
ability to meet that competency yields a flat account of agency too impoverished 
to explain the phenomenon of negligence.   
 As already explained (Section 7) and what is crucial to understand is that 
the gap between one’s competency and one’s actual performance in meeting 
that competency makes negligence possible.  Were it the case that actual 
performance was the limit of competency, then failing to meet one’s 
competency would have been impossible as, for that matter, would have 
exceeding one’s competency.  Not only is this conclusion prima facie 
implausible, but denying the gap between competency and ability to meet it is 
incompatible with the very idea of negligence as well as with the evaluation, 
liability, and sense of ownership that typically appropriately accompany 
exceeding or falling below one’s competency.  Moreover, accepting that there 
is such a gap between competency and performance, and recognizing that when 
conduct is characterized as negligent this gap is a function of a failure in the 
agent to live up to her competency, lead to the realization that there is a 
distinction between one’s competency and how good one is – the quality of 
one’s agency – at meeting that competency.  The size of the gap can fluctuate, 
allowing for two people, such as Ed and Ned, of similar competency yet 
different abilities when it comes to meeting that competency.  
 
10.4   Quality of Agency Set at Birth?  
 
14  Bernard Williams, “Moral Luck” in D Statman, ed, Moral Luck (State 
University of New York Press, 1993) 35.   
15 On victim resentment see David Heyd, “Resentment and Reconciliation: 
Alternative Responses to Historical Evil” in A Gosseries & LH Meyer, eds, 
Justice in Time (Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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But are people not born with an already set quality of agency?  And if so, does 
not the spirit of my overall approach suggest that we are not responsible for 
manifestations of those features of the quality of our agency?  I think not.  First, 
unlike our humanity, quality of individual agency is not entirely set in stone.  
Accordingly, “the original sin problem” does not arise here to the same extent 
as it does in the case of our human fallibility.  Moreover, even if to an extent 
our capability to meet our competency is set at birth – for example perhaps some 
people are just born careless or absent-minded – ascribing responsibility to an 
individual person based on her agency’s innate shortcomings may still in some 
sense involve personal responsibility.  Because responsibility here is attributed 
based on features that make one the individual person one is, rather than merely 
a member of a species. 
 
10.5   A Lottery Paradox?  
My argument for reduced or the absence of responsibility in certain cases of 
negligence is not based on the claim that any particular one instance of 
negligence was unavoidable due to human imperfection and, therefore, one is 
not responsible for it because one could not have done otherwise.  Although I 
do think that there may be something to this line of thought, it nevertheless has 
an air of paradox in the vicinity of the “Lottery Paradox”16 or the “Preface 
Paradox.”17  Here is why.  On the one hand, a measure of negligence in a 
person’s life does appear inevitable.  Yet on the other hand, when looked at 
separately, all particular instances of negligence seem avoidable – recall that 
negligent conduct involves unwittingly failing to do that which one should and 
could have done.  The problem, therefore, is that while both claims seem true, 
they do not cohere.  Hence the air of paradox.   
 In any case, it is important to stress that my argument is based not on the 
unavoidability of any instance of negligence but rather on the varying degree of 
involvement and engagement of individual agency in every instance of 
negligence.   
 
10.6   Derivative-Responsibility (or “Tracing”) is Irrelevant 
 ‘Derivative responsibility’ or ‘tracing’ does not help us with the puzzle at 
hand.  What is derivative responsibility?  Well, even if one is not directly 
 
16 On the “lottery paradox” see Henry Kyburg, Probability and the Logic of 
Rational Belief (Wesleyan University Press,1961). 
17 On the “preface paradox” see DC Makinson, “The Paradox of the Preface” 
(1965) 25:6 Analysis 205–207.              
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responsible for phi-ing, one’s responsibility for phi-ing may derive from one’s 
responsibility for psi-ing, specifically where one’s subsequent phi-ing was a 
reasonably foreseeable outcome of one’s psi-ing. 18    This is a familiar 
construction in law.  For example, although when inebriated one may lack 
capacity for responsibility, one’s responsibility for driving under the influence 
derives from one’s responsibility for knowingly having put oneself in a position 
in which it was reasonably foreseeable that one would act irresponsibly – that 
is consciously choosing to get drunk at the pub while knowing that once drunk 
one might then likely endeavor to drive home.19  Philosophers talk of “tracing” 
with a similar idea in mind.20 
 Yet the idea of derivative-responsibility does not explain what we set out to 
examine.  First, some cases of negligence clearly do not involve derivative-
responsibility.  For instance, Ned’s malpractice is a paradigmatic case in which 
we hold people responsible, yet it does not involve derivative-responsibility.  
The error Ned made while operating was not a reasonably foreseeable outcome 
of the treatment.  After all, even if not the best, Ned is a competent surgeon, 
which is why there was nothing wrongful – vis-à-vis his subsequent malpractice 
– in Ned’s decision to perform the operation.  
 Second, derivative-responsibility does not fit our everyday judgments 
regarding responsibility for negligence.  For instance, the disappointment, 
censure, and blame that instances of responsibility for negligence tend to attract 
– both from the culprit herself as well as from others – are invariably for acting 
negligently, not for foreseeably causing oneself to act negligently.  
 
10.7   Attributionism, Not Volitionism  
 
As briefly explained in Section 3, volitionism is the view that responsibility for 
phi-ing is somehow grounded in one’s willing one’s phi-ing; a paradigm of 
responsibility that fits nicely with our ideas about responsibility for intentional 
conduct.  As explained, the problem is that volitionism does not seem able to 
account for responsibility for unwitting conduct.     
 
18 I say reasonably “foreseeable” because one is obviously not responsible for 
all the outcomes of one’s conduct.  
19 See Dan B Dobbs, The Law of Torts Vol. 1 (Westgroup, 2000) at 493-550; 
Restatement (second) Torts § 283 C, cmt. d.  For a case involving an epileptic 
seizure while driving see People v Decina 138 N.E.2d 799 (1956).    
20   E.g., John M Fischer & Neal A Tognazzini, “The Truth About Tracing” 
(2009) 43:3 Nous 531; Zimmerman, supra note 6. 
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 It is important to note, however, that volitionism is not the only game in 
town. 21  What is labeled “attributionism” is an alternative paradigm of 
responsibility, rejecting volition as a necessary condition for responsibility and 
opening the door for responsibility for unwitting conduct.  Broadly speaking, 
attributionists recognize that when conduct involves certain specified features 
of one’s agency the conduct is attributable to that agent in a way that establishes 
her responsibility for the conduct, even if she did not intend or choose to so 
act. 22   While I believe novel and perhaps even surprising, my account of 
responsibility in negligence does fall within an established paradigm.  
 
10.8   Isn’t It “The Better You Are the More Responsible You Become”? 
Do we not expect more from those who are better at performing a certain task?  
If anything, are they not more responsible for their negligence?  Going back to 
the doctors’ example, let’s imagine a third character called Meg.  Meg’s rate of 
success in the operating room is 85%, which is lower than Ed’s rate of 99.9%.  
On a given day both accidently make the same inadvertent error.  If anything, is 
Ed not more responsible for his negligence than Meg is for hers?  After all, all 
things considered, he is the better doctor – do we not hold him to a higher 
standard?  Is not his negligence more the result of his agency as an individual 
than of his human imperfection?    
 Not necessarily.  The example trades on ambiguity.  What is not clear is 
whether the difference between the two doctors’ success rates is a function of 
different degrees of ability – that is whether the difference is a function of 
variations in competency – or is it a function of variations in quality of agency 
at meeting their competency (or some combination of both factors).  My 
contention that responsibility for negligence is predicated on quality of agency 
at meeting one’s competency was fleshed out through exploring an example of 
two doctors (Ned and Ed) of similar competency yet of different caliber of 
agency: one consistently had more episodes of agency failures than the other.  
Setting the two’s competency for the same level helped flesh out – accounting 
 
21 On the distinction between attributionism and volitionism see e.g., Smith, 
supra note 4. 
22 See e.g., Scanlon, supra note 13 at 268-69; Angela M Smith, “Responsibility 
for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life” (2005) 115:2 Ethics 236; 
George Sher, “Out of Control” (2006) 116:2 Ethics 285; Tadros, supra note 1; 
Pamela Hieronymi, “Responsibility for Believing” (2008) 161:3 Synthese at 
357; Angela Smith, “Control, Responsibility and Moral Assessment” (2008) 
138:3 Philosophical Studies 367; Smith, Ibid. 
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for the implications that human fallibility has for personal responsibility – how 
the pair’s degrees of responsibility for their respective negligence were sensitive 
to the quality of their respective agencies.   
 We can reach a similar conclusion about responsibility for negligence by 
looking at a case of two doctors of similar quality of agency yet of different 
competency.  Although of similar quality of agency in meeting their respective 
competencies, such doctors would exhibit a different success rate due to the 
difference in their competencies.  Yet I believe that the level of responsibility 
of each one of these doctors for a given unwitting error is the same.  As 
explained, we should not expect a person to outperform her competency, which 
is why so long as each doctor is largely living up to her competency she is not 
or at least she is less responsible for her rare unwitting failures.  Given that some 
such failure is unavoidable, the two doctors’ responsibility for any given failure 
will increase with their failures becoming more a function of their shortcomings 
as individual agents than of their fallibility as human agents.  Given that the two 
doctors exhibit similar levels of care – the quality of each one’s agency at 
meeting his or her individual competency is the same – their responsibility for 
their failures is also the same, regardless of the fact that one doctor errs more 
often than the other due to the disparity in competency.                            
 The objection under consideration appears to have the most traction in cases 
in which the difference in performance is a function of the two doctors’ different 
degrees of competency where, in addition, the more successful doctor 
demonstrates a lower degree of care, that is, his agency fails more and is less 
able at meeting its own competency.  In such cases we do hold the better doctor 
more responsible for an instance of negligence.   
 But here too, at the end of the day, the objection is unconvincing.  Here is 
why.  Assume Meg’s 85% success rate is a function of her mediocre 
competency but high quality of agency at meeting that competency and that 
Ed’s 99.9% success rate is a function of his extraordinary abilities and 
competency but mediocre agency at meeting that competency.  In such a case 
Ed’s responsibility for his rare unwitting failures is indeed greater than Meg’s – 
as the objection assumes.  Yet the reason for this is Ed’s agency’s lower level 
of care in meeting his very high level of competency.  Thus, even though Ed 
performs better than Meg, Ed’s performance in relation to his competency is 
less impressive than Meg’s performance in relation to her competency.  
Accordingly, even in those cases in which we sense the more responsible party 
is the person with a better overall performance rate, the reason for this is still 
his lower quality of agency at meeting his competency and not his high level of 
competency.  
  
 22 
 
